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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, proposals that aim to defend humanism, such 
as that of Jean-Paul Sartre in Existentialism Is a Humanism, 
emphasize the importance of the view that all human 
beings are not ends-in-themselves, but rather that they 
are constantly out of themselves and that it is through the 
constant transcendence (dépassement) and the projection 
of their selves beyond themselves that they can exist. 
Though this conception of humanism defended by Sartre is 
prima facia appealing, it is potentially problematic insofar 
as it can be interpreted, in virtue of the universalistic and 
egalitarian ambitions that accompany it, as inadvertently 
supporting and legitimizing a Western colonialist project 
in which Europeans aimed to project themselves over 
the world and shape it in accordance with their ambitions 
in a way that fattened diferences and homogenized 
experiences. In light of this concern, the main goal of this 
paper is, parallel to the work that Kathryn T. Gines1 and 
Robert Bernasconi2 have done developing a critical reading 
of Sartre’s position on humanism (particularly, of Sartre’s 
engagement with Frantz Fanon’s views in “Black Orpheus”), 
to argue that we can fnd conceptual resources in the work 
of Mexican philosopher Emilio Uranga (1921–1988) to 
develop a form of humanism that partially transcends some 
of the problematic consequences of the universalizing and 
egalitarian ambitions of Sartre’s conception of humanism. 
To make this argument, I ofer in my paper a brief exposition 
and analysis of one of the most important works of Uranga, 
Análisis del Ser del Mexicano,3 which was strongly infuenced 
by French existentialism, but also by Heidegger’s thought. I 
proceed in the following fashion. After presenting in Section 
Two of the paper a more detailed review of the conception 
of humanism as Sartre characterizes it in Existentialism Is 
a Humanism and highlighting some of the main problems 
and shortcomings that it exhibits in my view, I move on in 
Section Three of the paper to present and discuss Uranga’s 
proposal. In particular, I introduce frst in this section the 
gist of his proposal, which involves ofering an ontological 
analysis of Mexican being, or Mexicanness (lo mexicano), 
and pointing out that what distinguishes the ontology 
of Mexicanness from the ontology of Europeanness is 
that while Europeans view themselves as substances, 
Mexicans conceive of themselves as accidents. Therefore, 
since the being of Mexicans is accidental (and, in virtue 
of this, eminently contingent and fragile), Uranga then 
claims that this very state of afairs constitutes the basis 
of developing a new form of humanism to the extent that 
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the realization and the embracing of this contingency and 
fragility leads Mexicans to adopt a certain “lucidity.” This 
“lucidity” of Mexicans vis-à-vis their condition is for Uranga 
the basis of a humanism since it is “the original model to 
open oneself to the human condition.” Thus, for Uranga, 
the state of being Mexican provides the groundwork for 
a new form of humanism insofar as Mexicans, because of 
their self-awareness of their accidental being, value each 
other and other human beings in virtue of their accidental 
and contingent characters. In Section Four, I argue that the 
proposal that Uranga presents concerning the development 
of a new form of humanism based on the notion of accident 
is valuable since it ofers the conceptual resources needed 
to develop a type of humanism that is not underscored 
by the problems and shortcomings that afict Sartre’s 
proposal. Finally, in Section Five, I ofer a brief conclusion. 
2. SARTRE’S HUMANISM IN EXISTENTIALISM IS
A HUMANISM 
Let me present briefy some of the central characteristics 
of Sartre’s humanism as it is presented in Existentialism Is 
a Humanism.4 After characterizing in the frst part of the 
essay the notion of existentialism and highlighting the 
core features that are common to the main strands (in 
particular, the religious strand of Kirkegaard and Marcel 
and the atheist strand articulated by Heidegger and 
himself), Sartre proceeds in the second part of the essay 
(where he considers some potential objections to his view) 
to examine in what sense his existentialism constitutes 
a humanism. To do this, Sartre distinguishes two ways 
in which an existentialist view can be characterized as a 
humanism by diferentiating two notions of humanism in 
the following passage: 
Actually, the word “humanism” has two very 
diferent meanings. By “humanism” we might 
mean a theory that takes man as an end and as the 
supreme value. For example, in his story Around 
the World in 80 Hours Cocteau gives expression to 
this idea when one of his characters, fying over 
some mountains in an airplane, proclaims “Man is 
amazing!” (. . .) But there is another meaning to the 
word “humanism.” It is basically this: Man is always 
outside of himself, and it is in projecting and losing 
himself beyond himself that man is realized; and, 
on the other hand, it is in pursuing transcendent 
goals that he is able to exist. Since man is this 
transcendence (dépassement) and grasps objects 
only in relation to such transcendence, he is 
himself the core and focus of his transcendence.5 
After distinguishing these two conceptions of humanism, 
Sartre maintains that the existentialism that he adopts is 
a humanism in the second sense, and he takes such a 
humanism to be a good attitude since its adoption enables 
us to bear in mind that we are self-creating entities and that 
we can only fully realize our humanity by constantly striving 
to transcend or surpass ourselves: 
This is humanism because we remind man that 
there is no legislator other than himself and that 
he must, in his abandoned state, make his own 
choices; and also because we show that it is not 
by turning inward, but by constantly seeking a goal 
outside of himself in the form of liberation, or of 
some special achievement, that man will realize 
himself as truly human.6 
Though this is prima facie a quite attractive conception of 
humanism, a thorough examination of Sartre’s words reveals 
some potential problems. Indeed, when we consider how 
the notion of “transcendence” might have been understood 
by Sartre’s European readers at the time, one possible 
interpretation of Sartre’s words is that the humanist drive to 
“transcend” is primarily or paradigmatically manifested in 
the Western colonial enterprise through which Europeans 
aimed to project themselves over the rest of the world 
in order to shape it in their image.7 Now, though Sartre 
would probably have rejected this interpretation of his 
words insofar as he sympathized deeply with anti-colonial 
movements and advocated on their behalf, it is important 
to notice that some passages in Sartre’s work involve some 
troublesome undertones: 
And, as diverse as man’s projects may be, at least 
none of them seem wholly foreign to me, since 
each presents itself as an attempt to surpass such 
limitations, to postpone, deny or to come to terms 
with them. Consequently, every project, however 
individual, is of universal value. Every project— 
even one belonging to a Chinese, an Indian, or an 
African––can be understood by a European. To say 
it can be understood means that the European of 
1945, though his situation is diferent, must deal 
with his own limitations in the same way, and so 
can reinvent within himself the project undertaken 
by the Chinese, of the Indian or the black African. 
There is universality in every project, inasmuch as 
any man is capable of understanding any human 
project.8 
This passage is problematic because, though Sartre 
claims that the humanism that he subscribes to is one in 
which “every project, however individual, is of universal 
value,” he also contends that “every project––even one 
belonging to a Chinese, an Indian or an African––can be 
understood by a European” and that “any man is capable 
of understanding any human project.” These claims are 
troubling in two respects. First, Sartre manifests here, in 
spite of his vigorous denunciation of anti-Black racism 
and white supremacy in other places, a trait common to 
many European thinkers, which is, in Charles W. Mills’s 
words, “the centering of the Euro and later Euro-American 
reference group as constitutive norm.”9 Indeed, as the 
passage suggests, some projects seem to be more remote 
or foreign than others vis-à-vis a particular standard, which 
is provided by Europeans of 1945. Second, the claim that 
“any man is capable of understanding any human project” 
is also unsettling because, given the prior context (which 
stresses the possibility that Europeans may reinvent 
themselves in the projects undertaken by others), it strongly 
suggests that Europeans can easily understand (and, 
thus, potentially take over and carry out) any other human 
project. This involves re-inscribing in the humanism that 
Sartre articulates a white epistemic normativity as a kind 
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of benchmark, which partially undermines the claim about 
the universal value of each human project. Considering 
this, it is then patent that the humanism advocated by 
Sartre is partially shaped by certain Eurocentric biases 
and assumptions. These biases and assumptions are 
also at work in Sartre’s examination of négritude in “Black 
Orpheus,” where he writes the following: 
In fact, négritude appears as the minor moment 
of a dialectical progression; the theoretical and 
practical assertion of white supremacy is the 
thesis; the position of negritude, as an antithetic 
value, is the moment of negativity. But this negative 
moment is not sufcient in itself and these blacks 
who make use of it know this perfectly well; 
they know it aims at preparing the synthesis or 
realization of the human in raceless society. Thus, 
négritude is for destroying itself, it is a passage, 
and not an outcome, a means and not an ultimate 
end.10 
Thus, in light of the fact that Sartre’s humanism is one 
which conceives certain anti-colonialist projects (such 
as the one advocated by négritude proponents such 
as Senghor) as “moments of negativity,” one can then 
appreciate that it exhibits a clear failure to understand the 
nature and the importance of the lived Black experience 
since Sartre advocates for its eventual elimination.11 Given 
the existence of these problems that are created by Sartre’s 
ignorance of the sufering of Black people (and of the 
practical knowledge derived from this sufering),12 one 
should then examine if other philosophical projects within 
the existentialist tradition are better positioned to articulate 
a more inclusive framework. In the next couple of sections, 
I turn to examine the humanism articulated by Emilio 
Uranga, and I argue that it provides, in some respects, a 
better alternative than the humanism of Sartre since it does 
not fall prey to the same objections. 
3. URANGA’S HUMANISM IN ANÁLISIS DEL SER
DEL MEXICANO 
The best exposition of Uranga’s humanism is ofered in 
his most important work, Análisis del Ser del Mexicano. 
In this work, Uranga’s main goal is to ofer an ontological 
analysis of Mexican being (lo mexicano). For Uranga, this 
analysis should not be considered as a philosopher’s 
abstract intellectual exercise, but rather a key social task 
to accomplish to the extent that, as he stresses in the 
Introduction, it is aimed to ultimately transform the moral 
and social condition of Mexicans: 
To clarify what is the mode of being of the Mexican 
is just a step––a necessary one––to operate 
subsequently a reform and a conversion. Rather 
than a sterile rigorous meditation about the being 
of the Mexican, what drives us to this type of 
studies is the project of operating moral, social and 
religious transformations on this being.13 
For Uranga, the project of undertaking a moral and social 
transformation of the Mexican is justifed by the fact that, in 
spite of the fact that Mexico achieved its independence in 
1821 and it that underwent a civil war in the second decade 
of the twentieth century (i.e., the Mexican Revolution) that 
undid many of the colonial structures that had endured 
during the nineteenth century, the Mexican society of the 
late 1940s and early 1950s remained in various respects 
very dependent on foreign economic and cultural 
forces and internally torn apart by diferent competing 
aspirations. Thus, in order to undertake a viable project to 
transform Mexican society in order to address its problems 
and shortcomings, Uranga then proposed as a frst step 
to analyze in detail Mexican being. And this analysis, for 
Uranga, had to be ontological rather than historical or 
sociological. The central reason to undertake this type of 
analysis is laid out by Uranga in the following passage: 
The ontological analysis is, then, of a very particular 
kind. Its categories, or most general concepts, are 
the broadest possible designations of the kinds, 
types, or modes of being. It is only when we stick 
to these categories that the analysis is correct. If 
the analysis is not done in these terms, it takes the 
form of an image or a metaphor.14 
After justifying in the Introduction the need to perform an 
ontological analysis of the Mexican, Uranga then proceeds 
to put forth his proposal. To do this, he frst reminds his 
readers that one of the crucial ontological categories 
discussed within the Western tradition is that of accident. In 
fact, to be more specifc, Uranga maintains that the notion 
of accident has been traditionally studied in opposition or 
contrast with the notion of substance along the following 
lines: While the notion of substance has been understood 
as a primary or fundamental mode of being (i.e., as 
providing “the bedrock of reality”), the notion of accident 
has been understood as a mode of being that is dependent 
on substance (and, in light of this, as a mode of being that 
is secondary, fragile, or transitory). On this issue, Uranga 
writes this: 
The accident is always projected, or projects 
itself from or towards the outside, and it is never 
exhausted in the present thing, but it constitutes 
itself in the horizon and the halo that surrounds 
things, in the out-of-focus of their presence. 
Pushing in this vein, the accident is primarily that 
which is leftover, the remainder, the excedent 
(super-esse). In another respect, the accident 
is that which is fragile and brittle, that which is 
equally rooted in the being and in the non-being.15 
On the basis of this characterization of accident, Uranga 
moves on to argue that the notion is of paramount 
importance to his project since “the accident, defned in 
accordance to these abovementioned notes, will help us 
to explain or account for the Mexican.” The reason that he 
gives to deploy the notion of accident as a key ontological 
category in the analysis of Mexican being is that, in virtue 
of the long history of colonization by Spaniards, Mexicans 
have not been traditionally seen as fully human, but 
rather as exhibiting humanity in a partial, incomplete, or 
accidental way. In virtue of this, since Spaniards traditionally 
considered themselves as fully and substantially human (in 
contrast to the original Amerindian inhabitants of Mexico 
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and to the diferent racially mixed groups that emerged 
during the colonial period), Uranga writes that the notion of 
accident is of central importance in his ontological analysis 
of Mexican being because the notion of “substance” is tied 
to an explicit attempt to devalue non-Europeans as less 
than human: 
Every interpretation of “man” as a substantial 
creature seems inhuman to us. In the origins of our 
history, we had to precisely endure a devaluing in 
virtue of our dissimilarity to the European “man.” 
In the same spirit, we return this qualifcation 
and disavow as “human” the construction of the 
European that grounds human dignity on some 
substance.16 
Given the problematic undertones attached to the notion 
of substance, Uranga forcefully advocates using the notion 
of accident to develop an ontological analysis of Mexican 
being for two reasons. It not only refects the historical 
conditions in which Mexicans emerged as a group, but it 
also mirrors core features of the human condition, which 
are our mortality and our contingency: 
The being of man is perishable, mortal, doomed 
to die and to end. Being a man involves having an 
“obligation,” a “duty,” an ontological “imperative” 
to die or end. The same thing happens with the 
accidental being. In this case, we deal with a being 
that must turn himself in into an accident, that must 
put himself in a radical situation where he does 
not know what to expect, marked by insecurity and 
unpreparedness.17 
Uranga proceeds to use the notion of accident to ofer 
an analysis of Mexican being given that the notion 
appears to be an appropriate tool for this task in light of 
the previously mentioned remarks. In particular, one of 
the uses that Uranga gives to it consists in articulating a 
diferent notion of humanism. Now, as we saw previously 
in Section Two, the humanism that Sartre develops is one 
that is grounded in the constant drive to transcend and 
that also has universalistic and egalitarian aspirations for all 
projects (although these are partially thwarted by the fact 
that Sartre seems to assume that certain projects are more 
transcendent than others or more foreign than others vis-
à-vis a particular European standard). In stark contrast, the 
Mexican humanism that Uranga proposes is not grounded 
on the drive to be outside of oneself or transcend, but 
rather on the feelings brought about by the visceral 
realization that there are certain features (e.g., vulnerability 
and fnitude) that are impossible to transcend: 
The “feelings” of abandonment, needlessness, 
fragility, oscillation, and embarrassment among 
others, which are familiar to the Mexican as the 
fabric or “matter” of his being, ofer a unique basis 
upon which humanism can be grounded. At the 
most extreme limit, the Mexican views himself 
as “accidental and anguished,” which entails that 
he opens himself to the human condition at its 
deepest level.18 
In virtue of this, the humanism that Uranga proposes is one 
which is rooted in certain distinctive psychological features 
of the Mexican. These features make him, according to 
Uranga, open to the human condition precisely because 
the human condition is one which is crucially marked by 
mortality, fnitude, and accidentality. In virtue of this, 
Mexican being provides a basis for a type of inclusive, 
compassionate humanism since it ofers Mexicans a way to 
relate to and understand other human experiences in a way 
that connects with their fragility and anguish: 
The Mexican understands other humans by 
transposing the meaning of his own life. The 
compassion of which he makes such a frequent 
use in all the expressions of his conduct . . . is the 
visible expression of this continuous operation 
through which he transfers the meaning of his own 
life to other things.19 
Consequently, the humanism that Uranga proposes 
appears to be diferent from the one proposed by Sartre 
insofar as it involves, not an attempt to transcend or 
surpass by projecting oneself outside of oneself, but rather 
an attempt to humanize others by relating them to one’s 
condition of accidentality and anguish (zozobra). What I 
want to show in the next section is that, precisely because 
of these features, Uranga’s humanism is not subject to the 
same type of problems that arise in the case of Sartre’s. 
4. SOME ADVANTAGES OF URANGA’S MEXICAN
HUMANISM 
As I mentioned above, I want now to briefy examine how 
Uranga’s proposal is able to escape some of the limitations 
or drawbacks that afect Sartre’s proposal. To do this, it 
is important to remember that the humanism that Sartre 
advocates for is one that is crucially shaped by egalitarian 
and universalistic aspirations in which “every project, 
however individual, is of universal value.” However, it is 
precisely because of this ambition that Sartre fails to realize 
that we are always situated, that our respective situatedness 
makes our projects incapable to be fully understood 
and carried out by others (and, conversely, that makes 
the projects of others unable to be fully understood and 
carried out by us) and that, consequently, the egalitarian 
and universalistic ambitions of his humanism threaten to 
fatten diferences and homogenize experiences. 
In contrast to Sartre, Uranga acknowledges that, even 
though “the openness to everything that is human, the 
mixing and tangling without fear or reservation seem to 
create between the Mexican and other men an unlimited 
communication wherein equality stands out as a supreme 
aspiration,” he also maintains that “despite this undeniable 
communicability, there is an insuperable limit.”20 Because 
of this barrier, our projects cannot be fully understood 
and carried out by others (and we cannot expect to 
fully understand and carry out the projects of others). 
Considering this, Uranga proposes a humanism that does 
not aspire to an ideal of universal equality in which any 
human being can understand any project, but to an ideal 
of “coupling” (emparejamiento), as he makes clear in the 
following passage: 
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Rather than a feeling of equality with respect to 
others, there is in us a feeling of “coupling” and 
in the nationalist one of “diference.” Not every 
humanism is built upon the structure that we 
have highlighted. Generally, one believes that 
humanism presupposes the afrmation of equality 
and that, without it, there is no possibility of 
humanism. But this is nothing but a prejudice.21 
After stressing this point, Uranga then maintains that it 
is possible to articulate a humanism that bypasses the 
egalitarian demand and substitutes it with a “coupling” that 
he describes in the following terms when he analyzes how 
Mexicans conceive the relation between life and death: 
One usually thinks that the “diference” between 
life and death is the indispensable premise for 
every theory of life and death. But we have seen 
that this is not the case. The Mexican “couples” 
them highlighting their similarities until they 
reach “equality.” The same thing happens with 
humanism. The human is familiar to the Mexican 
because it follows him throughout life as the other 
pole with which it establishes a communication of 
meaning . . . a transference of meaning that allows 
him to explain his own life as human and, at the 
same time, the human as Mexican.22 
As this passage shows, Uranga’s humanism avoids the 
shortcomings of Sartre’s to the extent that it does not 
emphasize the equality of all projects (or even equality 
as a regulative ideal), but rather articulates an alternative 
based on the notion of “coupling,” which involves pairing 
or juxtaposing what seem to initially be entirely diferent 
phenomena (e.g., life and death) and highlighting 
progressively their resemblances and similarities through 
a process of transference of meaning until they become 
mixed or entangled while remaining distinct. In other terms, 
the humanism of Uranga is characterized by being rooted 
in a particular existential condition that is paradigmatically 
manifested in the Mexican, which he labels nepantla. 
Considering that, as Carlos Sanchez points out in his 
commentary of Uranga, “Nepantla refers to an ambivalent 
middle ground that is neither and both extremes”23 and that 
“it rests in the conjunction that ties together the extremes 
as a logical glue,”24 this mixing or entanglement of diferent 
phenomena is not equality for Uranga. Indeed, as Uranga 
stresses, the coupling always involves at the end of the 
day an insuperable barrier or diference, but it is precisely 
in virtue of this that it enables a transfer of meaning that 
makes possible connecting the experience of zozobra (i.e., 
the Mexican particularity) to the universal (e.g., the human 
condition). And it also allows grasping the universal human 
condition (which is marked by accidentality and fragility) as 
refecting a personal, Mexican experience of zozobra. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude. I have argued that Uranga’s conception 
of humanism is able to avoid some of the problems and 
shortcomings that Sartre’s exhibits. This is due to the 
fact that, though Sartre’s conception of humanism has 
egalitarian and universalistic aspirations, it is partially 
shaped by certain Eurocentric biases. In contrast, insofar as 
the humanism defended by Uranga is rooted in “feelings” 
of abandonment, needlessness, and fragility (which, 
according to him, are constitutive of the Mexican), it allows 
Mexicans to open themselves to the human condition 
and to understand others as human while preserving a 
limit or diference that prevents Mexicans from being 
able to “equalize” or “substitute” themselves with them 
(and vice versa). In light of this, the notion of humanism 
proposed by Uranga appears to be better suited than 
Sartre’s to develop a more inclusive approach to all human 
projects that genuinely respects them and does not 
fatten or homogenize them as Sartre’s does in virtue of 
its universalistic and egalitarian aspirations. This raises a 
central question: Is Uranga’s humanism also better suited 
in the respects previously mentioned in contrast to the 
humanisms of other European fgures such as Jaspers, 
Heidegger, and Beauvoir? I intend to examine this issue in 
future work. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Socially Undocumented: Identity and 
Immigration Justice 
Amy Reed-Sandoval (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2020). Paperback $36.88. ISBN 9780190619817. 
Reviewed by Luis Rubén Díaz-Cepeda 
UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE CIUDAD JUÁREZ 
There are so many great aspects to Socially Undocumented: 
Identity and Immigration Justice that it was hard for me to 
decide which ones to talk about, given the limited space. 
Acknowledging, then, that some merits will be left out, 
I start by giving a very brief description of the structure 
of the book. It seems to me that Socially Undocumented: 
Identity and Immigration Justice is divided into two parts. 
In the frst part, Reed-Sandoval aims to understand from 
an egalitarian point of view the injustice of undocumented 
migrant oppression. In order to prove her point, she 
frst distinguishes between the legally and the socially 
undocumented. She then presents and defends a political 
understanding of a social group and discusses how this 
understanding bears upon what it means to be socially 
undocumented. In the second part, she introduces 
strategies to resist this oppression. Among them are 
the attentiveness of non-state actors, a focus on the 
perspectives of socially undocumented people themselves, 
and strategies of everyday resistance by migrants. 
I want to draw your attention to Reed-Sandoval’s
main theoretical contribution, the category of socially
undocumented, which Reed-Sandoval defnes as people
that “are presumed to be undocumented on the mere basis
of their appearance [and in consequence] are subjected
to what I call ‘demeaning immigration-related constraints’
or ‘illegalizing forces’ (that is, they are ‘socially illegalized’)
on that very basis” (14). As a Mexican national who has
lived, studied, and worked lawfully for twelve years in the
United States, I completely identifed with the description
from Reed-Sandoval. For example, when I drove a car with
Mexican license plates, the police continually stopped me.
But once I got a car with Texas license plates, I magically
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